What do we mean when we say ‘Conspiracy Theory’?

Most people know a conspiracy theory or two. Ever heard that the moon landing was faked? How about the one about Paul McCartney dying in 1966? Or what about the vicious idea that the Holocaust was actually faked by the Allies? One which you may not have heard was shared in 64 AD, claiming that it was the Emperor Nero himself who started the Great Fire of Rome.

Conspiracy theories seem to be increasingly relevant in today’s political discourse, with both the left and the right accusing each other of propagating conspiracy theories. Their current relevance can often make us forget that conspiracy theories have a history as well as a distinct emotional appeal. Across this broad history, conspiracy theories have varied wildly in their scope and themes, blurring the definition of ‘conspiracy theories’ themselves. Can we really refer to the faked moon landing, the Great Fire of Rome and Holocaust denial as common intellectual principles? This demonstrates why the study of conspiracy theories must be built upon a sound definition of conspiracy theories themselves.

It would be easy to say all these conspiracy theories, the monstrous and the silly, are united by their belief in a secretive plot to benefit the conspirators at the expense of the common good. That easily applies to Holocaust denial or the faked moon landing, but what about the conspiracy theory that the Nixon campaign commissioned a break-in at the Watergate hotel to bug the Democratic National Committee? That was certainly a secret plot which benefited the conspirators at the expense of the common good, but unlike the fake moon landing, the Watergate scandal really happened. Should this disqualify it as a ‘conspiracy theory’?

Adding further confusion is the easily overlooked benevolent conspiracy theories, which detail a secret plot which in-fact benefits the common good. The QAnon movement believes that Donald Trump embarked upon a secret war against the ‘deep state’, discreetly manipulating the machines of government to disempower a liberal elite. Whether or not this is positive depends on your own political perspective, so where does this fit into our definition of conspiracy theory?

The psychologist Rob Brotherton has made an interesting contribution, defining conspiracy theories in a way which untangles these semantics. Rather than defining conspiracy theories by whether they are benevolent, evil, true or untrue, Brotherton says that they are not only unproven, but unprovable by design.

This means that conspiracy theories are intended to remain just ‘theories’, with evidence always unobtainable or just out of reach. Whistle-blowers can always be paid off, documents can always be burned, photographs can always be faked, meaning conclusive proof either way remains elusive. This defines conspiracy theories from genuine accusations of wrongdoing, such as Watergate, which are rarely posed without evidence. It also resolves the ‘good vs evil’ distinction and the political perspective upon which it is dependent.

Finally, Brotherton’s definition implies that the goal of the conspiracy theorist is not necessarily to uncover hidden truth, rather, there is some appeal to the search for ‘truth’ which motivates theorists. What this motivation might be is a subject beyond the scope of one blog, but Brotherton’s definition is an excellent starting point for any researchers interested in finding out.

Billy Mann

Billy Mann is a PhD student at the University of Northampton. His work explores on the emotive dynamics of American fascist politics and focuses on the history of the leading neo-Nazi ideologue William Pierce.