Blog: Address to the Foreign Law Enforcement Community – combating firearms trafficking & terrorism

Dr Helen Poole, University of Northampton’s Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Health and Society and Dr Simon Sneddon, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University, co-lead the University’s Centre for the Reduction of Firearms Crime, Trafficking and Terrorism.

This week, they addressed the influential Foreign Law Enforcement Community (FLEC) meeting at the Headquarters of the National Crime Agency in London about the Centre’s research that looks at the movement of firearms across borders and how this is a feature of organised crime groups.

With a number of terrorist events having occurred across Europe, Dr Poole and Dr Sneddon argued that more needs to be done at all levels to increase international cooperation and they presented a number of ways for states to work to more effectively combat firearms trafficking and terrorism.

Here, they write about what those interventions need to be, how they would work in practice and the next steps for the research centre to increase understanding about the challenges of firearms related crime and terrorism…

The illicit movement and acquisition of small arms and light weapons by terrorists and criminals is a complex phenomenon, and one for which there is an incomplete knowledge base and understanding. For this reason, responding to and tackling this issue, requires a multi-faceted approach by a range of organisations and actors at local, national, regional and international levels.

The role of law enforcement is obviously critical in identifying and apprehending offenders and investigating offences. This includes both local and national police, specialist and intelligence services, prosecutors and the judiciary. However, one of the difficulties for identifying trafficking routes and exposing organised crime networks involved in the supply of firearms, is a lack of follow through in terms of looking beyond the specific firearms incident under investigation. If success is measured in terms of crime ‘clear-ups’, intelligence that can be revealed by a crime gun or ballistic sample, may be missed.

It is therefore important that investigators ‘follow the gun’: that is derive all possible ballistic, forensic and other intelligence related to the firearm, in order to link it to other crime scenes and potentially expose networks and trafficking routes. Technological solutions such as Interpol’s International Ballistics Intelligence System (IBIS) are available to assist with this.  Furthermore, the development of Firearms Focal Points, that is a central agency or entity, to coordinate all ballistics data on a national or regional level, is also believed to be effective in reducing firearms trafficking. This has been demonstrated by the success of the UKs National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS) and is now being developed in Eastern Europe.  Clearly these interventions require international cooperation and commitment to sharing intelligence in a timely fashion.

The largest source of illegal firearms is termed the ‘grey market’, that is firearms that are legally manufactured but diverted into the illicit market during various stages of manufacture and transportation. The black market, that firearms that are illicitly manufactured, makes up a much smaller percentage of the estimated 600-800 million firearms in circulation. This is in part a matter for the international community, within whose gift it is to exercise pressure on states to protect their legal firearms more effectively.

Geographically, a major source of firearms is conflict and post-conflict zones, where significant stockpiles of weapons are accumulated. For example, in Europe many weapons emanate from Eastern Europe where large numbers of small arms and light weapons were produced during the Yugoslav conflict. In 2010 there were an estimated 8 million weapons in circulation in the region. One response from the international community, under the auspice of the United Nations Development Programme, was to strengthen the containment of stockpiles, which are often plundered by criminals for use and resale, and to then destroy them. Emerging areas of concern, such as Libya, Syria and the Ukraine, also need to consider developing such programmes.

Technological developments, as with all areas of criminality, can become enablers of illicit firearms manufacture and supply. Many illicit firearms, parts and ammunition are available for purchase on the dark web, as well as the internet, and this presents a challenge for the law enforcement community. Such weapons may be legal in the country of origin, but illegal in the destination country. Often trafficking through the mail in parts, this can be difficult to detect and is also difficult to quantify. The role of the private sector in addressing this, as has been seen with shipping companies in the past, may be crucial in developing an intelligence picture of such activities. Technology has also provided a new form of firearms: 3D printed weapons.  Whilst there is some disagreement regarding the threat posed by such weapons, concerns may deepen as technology improves. The risk posed by such developments needs to be assessed by states and appropriate responses implemented.

The undeniable fact that firearms travel across country borders throws into start relief the issue of inconsistent legislative controls across the world. Even within the EU, where the 2017 Firearms Directive (Dir 2017/853/EU) is the overarching piece of legislation, there is a wide difference of interpretation. In the UK, the Firearms Act 1968 (as amended) governs the type and number of firearms that can be owned by a civilian (subject to the issue of a licence). In Poland, however, if a person is the member of a recognised shooting club or a collector, one can (again subject to a licence) buy as many firearms of as many different calibres as one wishes.

Further afield, there is a raft of regional and international legislative measures in place, many of which overlap in both their geographical and substantive scope. Across Africa, for example, as well as the 2013 arms Trade Treaty and 2005 Firearms Protocol to the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime, both of which are fully international in scope, there are at least five separate regional conventions – Bamako (2000), South African Development Community (202), Arab Model Law (2003), Nairobi Protocol (2004) and the ECOWAS Convention (2006). Some states in Africa are thus covered by multiple legal frameworks, and have chosen to ratify all, some, or none of them.

Even where states ratify, there may be public expressions of support for the control of the illicit firearms, but the practical implementation is far more problematic, as inadequate technology, often underpaid police forces and uncontrolled borders come into play.

Bizarrely, research suggests that where Organised Criminal Groups have a tight supply on the control and distribution of illicit firearms, it is very difficult for terrorist groups to acquire them. By contrast, in areas with a chaotic criminal landscape, terrorist find it easier to acquire weapons. What this means is that the key factor in whether terrorist acquire firearms is not legislation, but other criminal groups.

Find out more about the Centre for the Reduction of Firearms Crime, Trafficking and Terrorism.